We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both ‡ow pro…ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric …rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci…cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes.
Introduction
Business circumstances in which …rms in the same industry contemplate an investment in a growing market are prevalent. When demand is ‡uctuating and changes are uncertain, the investment timing impacts the expected value of their operations. In some cases, rival …rms invest simultaneously. For example, two leaders in the vaccines sector, GlaxoSmithKline and Sano… Pasteur MSD, a joint company of Sano… Aventis and Merck, brought their competing human papilloma virus vaccines to market at roughly the same time. In some other circumstances, the same competitors invest sequentially. In the case of the dengue vaccine, Sano… Pasteur seems to be a clear leader and GlaxoSmithKline a late entrant. 1 Such interactions are best studied in continuous time, with preemption models, and, in a stochastic environment, with real option game models. 2 Simultaneous investment can result either when …rms non-cooperatively coordinate their decisions, or in some cases when they cooperate.
Coordination has generally been modeled with the assumption that …xed costs are constant and stationary. A speci…city of our paper is to focus on two kinds of externalities, pro…t externalities and investment externalities. The former are well-known in real option games, as one …rm's investment generally impacts the ‡ow pro…t of others. The latter are less often emphasized, but allow the model to encompass cases where …xed costs are a¤ected by economies of scale in input production, location e¤ects, or learning, to mention just a few. With respect to cooperation, to our knowledge very few papers model this behavioral assumption. Another contribution of this paper is to relate our general results to known industrial organization models by specifying the structure underlying what are usually taken to be reduced form ‡ow pro…ts.
More speci…cally, we construct a model which allows for the ‡ow pro…t of a …rm to be either reduced or enhanced by the competitor's investment, and where the relative investment cost of ex-ante symmetric …rms depends on their sequence of moves, and thus is endogenous. This is complementary to several real option papers in the recent literature. In Hoppe [14] and in Huisman, Kort, and Thijssen [18] , the state of the project in which …rms invest is unknown ex- in "a massive new manufacturing plant" for the production of a new vaccine against the dengue fever, see Carroll, J., 2009, "Sano… breaks ground on $477M vax plant" (available at http://www.…ercevaccines.com). 2 For recent surveys of game theoretic real options models, see Chevalier-Roignant, Flath, Huchzermeier, and
Trigeorgis [7] , Azevedo and Paxson [2] , and Boyer, Gravel, and Lasserre [5] .
ante by both …rms. There is a second-mover advantage, as the …rst investor informs the other …rm whether the state of the project is low or high, though investment costs are symmetric. In
Hoppe [14] the …rms possibly already compete in the pre-investment period, in Huisman, Kort,
and Thijssen [18] the market is new, and in both papers the …rst investor receives a higher ‡ow pro…t. In Kort and Pawlina [20] , the costs of exercising the investment option are assumed to di¤er across the two …rms, and the e¤ect of the magnitude of the ex-ante cost asymmetry on the nature of equilibrium is characterized. When the two …rms have invested, their ‡ow pro…ts are symmetric.
In our model, the rank in the investment sequence determines the relative cost. The …rst investor can incur a lower investment cost, which can re ‡ect a location e¤ect (say, there is one best place for the investment). Alternatively, the second investor may bene…t from a reduced cost, as would arise if there is a form of learning or experience e¤ect pertaining to the investment process. The model speci…cations also capture situations in which a simultaneous investment has an impact -which can be either negative or positive -on investment costs, as occurs in case of congestion or synergies in the provision of a key input. Depending on the level of ‡ow pro…ts, which can capture cases of negative or positive product market externalities among competitors, the market can be new, or …rms can be active before any investment has occurred.
In this general framework, our main objective is to provide a thorough characterization of sequential ("preemption") and simultaneous ("coordination") non-cooperative equilibria. We …nd that both preemption and attrition may occur, depending on the nature of investment externalities. A sequential (preemption) investment equilibrium occurs if the investment externality is negative, or not too positive. Otherwise the …rms play a game of attrition. We provide a condition characterizing a simultaneous equilibrium, which we refer to as coordination. One key …nding is that more discounting reduces the likelihood of coordination, a result that mirrors tacit collusion in a repeated game (supergame) context. Absent investment externalities, less interdependence between …rms raises the likelihood of coordination.
Assuming that the requisite contracts are feasible, we also characterize a cooperative investment equilibrium, in which …rms jointly maximize industry value. When the cost of being second is relatively high, optimal cooperation involves either symmetric duopoly investment, asymmetric duopoly investment, or a single monopoly investment, depending on structural conditions we fully describe.
Finally, we provide some applications of these results. We do this for both capacity choice by Cournot duopolists, and investment in demand-enhancing R&D. In the examples we study, larger installed capacities ("footholds") and greater investment increments increase the likelihood of coordination, and greater spillovers and congestion e¤ects in the production of R&D increase the likelihood that cooperating …rms stagger their investments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct the model, introduce the terminology, and describe the payo¤ functions. In Section 3, we characterize the relative investment costs for which a sequential (preemption) equilibrium exists. In Section 4, we derive a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a simultaneous (coordination) investment equilibrium, and discuss several corollaries. In Section 5 we study investment timing when …rms cooperate in order to maximize industry value. In Section 6 we use our results to characterize simultaneous (coordination) equilibria in two model speci…cations, as adapted from the literature, that relate to capacity expansion and R&D investment.
The Model
The assumptions, most of which are standard, are described in the …rst part of this section.
Because the paper focuses on the link between speci…c externalities and the nature of equilibrium, the relevant terminology for the remainder of the paper is then described. Finally, we outline a set of payo¤ functions, which are standard for this kind of model and useful to the analysis that follows.
Assumptions
Flow pro…ts are of the form Y t ij , with i; j 2 f0; 1g. The multiplicative shock Y t is taken to follow a geometric Brownian motion dY t = Y t dt + Y t dZ t , with Y 0 > 0, > 0 (growth rate), > 0 (volatility), and where (Z t ) t 0 is a standard Wiener process. For example, this shock may be thought of as a measure of market size that evolves stochastically over time. The value of the multiplicative shock at the current date is hereafter denoted by y. The positive initial state Y 0 is assumed to be lower than all positive thresholds we consider below. For the equation of motion to describe a market in expansion, it is assumed that > 2 2 . 3 The interest rate, common to both …rms, is r. To rule out degenerate solutions, it is assumed that 0 < < r. 4 There are two risk-neutral …rms which are ex-ante symmetric. The time invariant component of ‡ow pro…t, ij , depends on the previous and current investment decisions of both …rms. When 3 The geometric brownian motion is derived from Yt = Y0 exp h 2 2 t + Zt i by using Itô's lemma. 4 It can be proved easily that a …rm increases value by waiting to invest forever if r .
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halshs-00639471, version 1 -9 Nov 2011 appropriate, is used to denote the vector ( 00 ; 10 ; 01 ; 11 ). Investment is a binary decision, and thus i takes the value 1 if the …rm has invested, and j takes the value 1 if its rival has invested. 5 If 0j = 0 we have a new market case, otherwise …rms are active in the pre-investment period. Investment is inherently discrete and of …xed size. For example, it may be thought of as a purchase of a manufacturing equipment, or as an R&D expenditure. The assumption that investment is a binary decision means that we consider a single round of investment choices by the …rms (see Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [4] for a model where …rms can invest in several "lumpy" capacity units). Investment is assumed to be desirable, that is 1i > 0i , i 2 f0; 1g. A second assumption regarding ‡ow pro…t that is made throughout the paper is that 10 > 01 , that is a …rm bene…ts more from its own investment than from its rival's.
Investment is costly, and the cost of investment may depend on previous and current investment decisions. If a single …rm is the …rst to invest, this cost is denoted by I L . If one …rm has already invested, the cost to the second …rm is denoted by I F . Finally, if both …rms invest simultaneously, this cost is denoted by I S . Thus, a cost asymmetry may arise even though the two …rms are identical ex-ante. 6 Allowing I L 6 = I F 6 = I S , with I F ; I L ; I S > 0, and no restriction in the ranking of the three cost levels, generalizes the analysis of some existing models (see the discussion on the terminology used in the paper below), and complements approaches in which ‡ow pro…ts depend on the entry sequence (such as in Mason and Weeds [24] ). When appropriate,
I is used to denote the vector (I F ; I L ; I S ). In the analysis, the ratios of investment costs play an important role, and it is useful to de…ne the following magnitudes:
Terminology
The focus of this paper is the (non-cooperative) coordination equilibria and cooperative strategies in investment timing. These outcomes are to be understood with reference to a (non-cooperative) preemption equilibrium, where …rms invest sequentially as a result of a race to be the …rst investor, and which dissipates monopoly rents. Firms deciding investment thresholds strategically may opt for an equilibrium that di¤ers from preemption in at least two ways. First, in a coordination equilibrium, …rms invest simultaneously. The choice of a sequential or simultaneous equilibrium solution may then be construed as a case of a coordination game. Second, the term cooperation 5 We restrict 11 to be independent of the sequence of investment decisions. For an alternative speci…cation which allows for a persistent …rst-mover advantage, see Mason and Weeds [24] . 6 A complementary work is Kort and Pawlina [20] , which studies the e¤ect of ex-ante …xed cost asymmetry on the nature of equilibrium.
5
halshs-00639471, version 1 -9 Nov 2011 refers to a framework in which …rms may make binding agreements and maximize industry pro…t (this terminology is discussed in Azevedo and Paxson [2] ).
The following speci…c terminology is used in the rest of the paper. 7 Investment is said to be jointly undesirable if 11 00 , and jointly desirable if 11 > 00 . This characteristic is key to determining the qualitative nature of coordination equilibrium, that is whether …rms jointly abstain from ever investing, or jointly delay investing for the same …nite amount of time. Either possibility may arise. For example, if investment involves an advertising campaign, negative advertising may decrease market size ( 11 00 ), whereas preferenceenhancing advertising may increase it ( 11 > 00 ).
Investment involves a (weakly) negative pro…t externality if i1 i0 , and a positive pro…t externality otherwise, with i 2 f0; 1g. Note that since investment is taken to be individually desirable, if it is jointly undesirable, then there must be a negative direct externality (that is, 00 11 and 1j > 0j together imply i1 < i0 , i; j 2 f0; 1g). Negative pro…t externalities seem natural in situations such as capacity investment, whereas positive pro…t externalities may be thought of as arising if investment is in R&D, when there is a large enough technological spillover. Note that we assume that 10 (<) 11 if and only if 00 (<) 01 , so the direction of pro…t externalities is consistent.
Investment involves a (weakly) negative investment externality if i 1, and a positive investment externality otherwise, with i 2 fF; Sg. When necessary we refer to S as a measure of simultaneous investment externality. Investment externalities may arise in one of two ways. A …rm's investment decision may raise or lower the cost of the next …rm that invests. For example, the former ( F > 1) would arise if …rms compete for some key resource, such as location, whereas the latter ( F < 1) would arise if there is a form of learning or experience e¤ect pertaining to the investment process. A similar learning phenomenon arises in Hoppe [14] and Huisman, Kort, and Thijssen [18] . Alternatively, capacity may be resold from the …rst …rm to the second (Li and Sick [22] ), or an input supplier might practice price discrimination (Billette de Villemeur, Ruble, and Versaevel [3] ). A second way in which investment externalities may arise is if joint investment has an impact on investment cost. This can happen either because there is a congestion in the provision of a key input (negative investment externality, S > 1), or a synergy if an important network externality arises when the …rms enter the market together (positive investment externality, S < 1).
Payo¤s
An equilibrium of the investment timing game involves a triplet of investment triggers chosen by the …rms, which is denoted as (y P ; y F ; y S ). The latter two triggers result from a well-studied optimization problem (see Dixit and Pindyck [9] ), and have the following expressions
where
2 is a standard expression in real option models. 8 The sign of 11 00 is key to determining the nature of the simultaneous equilibrium: when this expression is strictly positive, …rms jointly delay investing until a …nite threshold is reached. When it is negative however, in a simultaneous equilibrium, …rms jointly abstain from ever investing.
Up to the relaxation of the constraint that investment cost is invariant, the investment timing game closely follows the analyses of Grenadier [12] , Mason and Weeds [24] , Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux [4] . The derivation of the preemption threshold and the characterization of equilibrium involve the following …rm payo¤s.
The value of a …rm that invests immediately, when the current value of the multiplicative shock is y, is
where L is used to refer to the fact that the …rm is the leader in the market with respect to investment timing. Note that after y F is reached, one …rm's investment immediately triggers the second's, so that investment is e¤ectively simultaneous and the investment cost is I S .
The value of a …rm that invests as a follower when the multiplicative shock reaches the threshold y F , provided that the current value of the multiplicative shock is y, and provided that the rival …rm invests immediately at y, is
where F is used analogously to refer to the fact that the …rm invests as a follower, and also to the fact that the investment threshold y F results from an optimization. 8 In the certainty case, that is for = 0, we have = r and y y i = e r(t i t) , the continuous time discounting term.
The value of a …rm that invests when the multiplicative shock reaches the threshold y S , provided that the current value of the multiplicative shock is y, and provided that the rival …rm also invests only when the multiplicative shock reaches the threshold y S , is S (y) = 
where S is used to denote the fact that this payo¤ re ‡ects simultaneous investment by the two …rms, at a threshold y S that results from a straightforward optimization.
Sequential Investment (Preemption) Equilibrium
One focus of this paper is simultaneous investment and the coordination problem it may generate.
A necessary condition for a coordination problem to arise is that there be another equilibrium solution, namely a sequential investment equilibrium. Since in our model player roles are endogenous, the sequential investment equilibrium we consider has the nature of a preemption equilibrium. In a preemption equilibrium, …rms invest sequentially, either …rm may be the leader with equiprobability, and the race to be …rst dissipates the rents that accrue to the …rst investor. A preemption equilibrium is characterized by the triggers fy P ; y F g, with y P < y F , which denote the investment thresholds for the leader and follower. 9 The preemption trigger y P is determined by the "rent equalization" condition L (y P ) = F (y P ), i.e. …rms are indi¤erent between investing as a leader at y P and investing as a follower at y F when the leader invests at y P .
The existence of the preemption equilibrium when investment costs are invariant (
is well-established, and the same reasoning establishes the existence of a preemption equilibrium with asymmetric …rm-speci…c investment costs. 10 With investment externalities, which is a source of investment cost asymmetry, the same argument applies.
Proposition 1 in this section characterizes the relative investment costs for which a preemption equilibrium exists. Essentially, preemption arises whenever the investment externality is negative, or when the investment externality is not too positive and pro…t externalities are negative. This is to be expected as a negative investment externality means that the …rst …rm has a lower investment cost, and negative pro…t externalities induce preemption by reducing the attractiveness of the joint 9 This is a simpli…cation. See Fudenberg and Tirole [11] , Huisman et al. [17] , and Boyer et al. [4] for precise descriptions of the strategies underlying the preemption equilibrium. 1 , de…ne the threshold
This expression appears as a lower bound on relative investment cost in Proposition 1. The following lemma describes the relevant behavior of P (z; ).
Lemma 1 For 11 < 10 ;
In what follows, we denote P (z; ) simply by P . The conditions on F for a preemption equilibrium to exist can now be described.
Proposition 1 A sequential (preemption) equilibrium exists whenever F is su¢ ciently large:
(i) when pro…t externalities are non-negative ( 11 10 ), a preemption equilibrium exists if and only if investment externalities are negative ( F > 1);
(ii) when pro…t externalities are negative ( 11 < 10 ), a preemption equilibrium exists if and only if investment externalities are not too positive ( F P ).
Otherwise, the investment game is a war of attrition.
Thus, if pro…t externalities are positive so it is disadvantageous to be the sole …rm in the market to have invested, preemption occurs if there is a negative investment externality that makes investing …rst inherently attractive. In addition, if pro…t externalities are negative so it is advantageous to be the only …rm to have invested, the condition is slacker and preemption occurs even with a positive investment externality that is not too strong. If the positive investment externality is too strong, neither …rm seeks to enter …rst, and the investment game is in the nature of a war of attrition.
Since the study of the attrition game at this level of generality is beyond the scope of this paper, throughout the remainder it is assumed that the conditions of Proposition 1 on the investment externality ( F ) hold, so a preemption equilibrium exists. 1 1 In Huisman et al. [18] , the nature of the timing game similarly reverts from preemption to war of attrition depending on the magnitude of a second-mover advantage due to learning.
Simultaneous (Coordination) Equilibrium
In this section we develop a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the investment timing game to have a simultaneous equilibrium, in which …rms, instead of investing sequentially in a preemption equilibrium, both invest at the same trigger y S , which may be in…nite. 12 We refer to this case as coordination. 13 Unlike sequential (preemption) equilibrium in the previous section, in the presence of both investment and pro…t externalities, the simultaneous equilibrium may not be fully characterized.
The main proposition therefore involves restrictions on the space of admissible parameters. In certain subcases that are given afterwards, a full characterization may be obtained.
To begin, de…ne the following function:
Over the interval [0; min fy F ; y S g], the expression in (6) corresponds to the di¤erence S L, that is to the incentive to invest simultaneously rather than immediately and unilaterally.
We assume:
The parameter values (I; ; ) are such that b f (y) is convex.
It can be shown that this assumption holds for all whenever 10 11 (non-positive pro…t externalities). Otherwise (positive pro…t externalities), it requires that joint investment be desirable ( 11 > 00 ) and then holds for instance for 1.
Next, de…ne y L 1 r 10 00
The trigger y L is the optimal investment threshold for a leader, if the sequence of investments is exogenously determined.
Assumption (B)
The parameter values (I; ) are such that y L < min fy F ; y S g.
This second condition requires the investment and pro…t externalities to be such that a …rm, if given the guarantee of being the …rst to invest, would e¤ectively choose to do so unilaterally.
As a benchmark, for F = S = 1, Assumption (B) requires that pro…t externalities be nonpositive (therefore in this case it implies Assumption (A)) and that ‡ow pro…ts be submodular
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption (A) holds and consider the condition: 14
()) if (7) holds, a simultaneous equilibrium exists;
(() provided Assumption (B) holds, then if a simultaneous equilibrium exists, (7) holds.
Proof: See Appendix A.3
It remains to check that, when a simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium exists, it can yield higher payo¤s for both …rms than the sequential (preemption) equilibrium. To do that, we introduce another value function (as compared with (2), (3), and (4) above). It describes the ex-ante expected value of a …rm, at a market size y y P , when it anticipates that preemption occurs at y P and that it is equally likely to enter as a leader or as a follower at that threshold. 15 Formally:
This payo¤ satis…es V P (y P ) = L(y P ) = F (y P ). When the market size is below the preemption trigger, it is the comparison of S (y) with V P (y) that constitutes a valid criterion to assess whether the investment game has the features of a pure coordination game (i.e., whether the payo¤ from the simultaneous equilibrium is higher than the payo¤ under preemption, so that …rms have an incentive to coordinate on the former).
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions (A) and (B) are satis…ed. Then V P (y) < S (y), all y 2 [0; y S ], so that the simultaneous investment equilibrium dominates the premption equilibrium. IL. This is the trigger that would be chosen by an "altruistic" leader that internalizes the e¤ect of its entry on the rival's pro…t (without necessarily maximizing industry pro…t, on this see Proposition 5). 1 5 If initial conditions are such that Y0 > yP , other issues may be raised ("mistakes" may arise, see Huisman and
Kort [16] ).
Proof: See Appendix A.4
As is common in this literature, it is assumed throughout that when several equilibria exist, …rms achieve the Pareto superior equilibrium (see also footnote 12). Therefore, by Proposition 3, Proposition 2 is taken to provide conditions for a simultaneous investment equilibrium to e¤ectively arise.
As a direct consequence of the condition (7) in Proposition (2), we …nd:
Corollary 1 A simultaneous equilibrium can arise even in the new market case.
In the new market case there are no pro…ts without investment ( 00 = 01 = 0). Corollary 1 is noteworthy because in so-called standard real option game models without investment externalities, it is only in the existing market case ( 00 01 > 0) that simultaneous equilibrium arises (Boyer, Lasserre, Moreaux [4] , Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [6] ). In the present model, the two …rms may …nd it pro…table to coordinate their investments on the same threshold when a unilateral deviation from the simultaneous equilibrium is su¢ ciently handicapped by a high I L (positive investment externality). For example, suppose that 00 = 01 = 0, and 11 = . Another result follows directly from the fact that, whenever y L < min fy F ; y S g, in the limit the expression on the left side of the inequality sign in the condition (7) of Proposition 2 approaches 0 when tends to in…nity. The parameter is increasing in the risk-free rate r, and decreasing in the drift and volatility . The e¤ect of on the likelihood of simultaneous equilibrium, as described by Corollary 2, is thus consistent with the results that emerge in supergame models of tacit collusion. We now explore this comparison further.
The condition for simultaneous equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 2, S (y) L (y) 0, may be rewritten in an equivalent form that bears analogy to the supergame setting: 
1 6 The numerical values for ‡ow pro…ts are drawn from a capacity investment example developed in section 6.1, where …rms compete à la Cournot.
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The left side of the inequality (9) is the unilateral incentive to deviate from the simultaneous equilibrium, provided that the rival …rm's investment trigger remains at the simultaneous equilibrium level y S . This incentive consists of the present value of the increase in pro…ts that results from the monopoly investment phase, net of the opportunity cost of procuring the input unilaterally at the smaller market threshold y, rather than latter at y S . The right side of the inequality (9) is due to the reaction of the second …rm to the (instantaneously) observed deviation of its rival from the simultaneous equilibrium. Its interpretation depends on both pro…t and investment externalities.
To see that, suppose that y F < y S . Then, upon observing a deviation at any y < y F , the second …rm lowers its investment trigger from y S to y F . If pro…t externalities are negative, this earlier investment gives rise to a "punishment"phase, as the accelerated second investment shortens the period during which the …rst …rm earns monopoly investment pro…ts. 17 This punishment phase does not start immediately after detection, and its duration is …nite since the second …rm would have invested at the trigger y S anyway had no deviation occurred. Thus, although there is some similarity to the stability condition that arises in supergames, 18 and the corresponding equilibrium payo¤s (i.e., those that result from the choice to cooperate or defect, with the restricted strategy spaces fy S ; y P g and p M ; p M " for investment timing and repeated Bertrand duopoly, respectively) have the same structure, 19 the underlying dynamics are di¤erent in the investment timing and supergame contexts.
The rest of the section examines two special cases of simultaneous equilibrium. 1 7 If y F y S , then the second …rm's reaction to the observed deviation is to delay its investment, which constitutes a "punishment" with respect to monopoly investment if pro…t externalities are positive. 1 8 Consider a standard supergame, with in…nite horizon, and trigger strategies à la Friedman [10] , so that Nash reversion occurs forever if a …rm deviates in any given period. Letting , then the condition for collusion sustainability is
Given a state y < yP , in strategic form the static 2 2 meta game with the restricted strategy space fyP ; y S g is:
This payo¤ matrix has the same structure as the limit of the repeated game analog as period length (and detection lag) converge to zero.
No investment externalities (
The case of no investment externalities is the one that corresponds most closely to what is termed the standard real options model (Azevedo and Paxson [2] , and the derivation of the condition for coordination in this case can be found in Huisman [15] ). Under the assumptions of Proposition 2, ‡ow pro…ts must be submodular ( 00 + 11 10 + 01 ) and pro…t externalities must be non-positive ( i1 i0 , i 2 f0; 1g, and therefore Assumption (A) holds). The condition for simultaneous equilibrium (7) then has the form:
with u Thus, without investment externalities, the lower the complementarity in ‡ow pro…ts (the "less submodular" ‡ow pro…ts are, as v converges to 1 from below), the more likely is simultaneous equilibrium. Put another way, simultaneous equilibrium is more likely when ‡ow pro…ts are less interdependent, i.e. when the impact of a …rm's investment on its ‡ow pro…t is una¤ected by rival investment ( 11 01 almost equal to 10 00 ), and less likely otherwise.
By continuity, it is therefore possible to complement Corollary 2 as follows.
Corollary 3 Suppose Assumptions (A) and (B) are satis…ed. Then, if pro…t externalities do not re ‡ect strong interdependence ( 11 + 00 10 + 01 ) and investment externalities are small enough ( P ; S 1), a simultaneous equilibrium arises.
Joint investment not desirable ( 00 11 )
In this subsection we examine the case in which joint investment is not desirable. In this case, in a simultaneous equilibrium both …rms refrain from ever investing (y S = 1), so we refer to this the in…nite delay case. Because investment is individually desirable ( 1j > 0j ), it follows that pro…t externalities are negative ( i0 > i1 , i 2 f0; 1g, and therefore Assumption (A) holds).
By Proposition 1, for a preemption equilibrium to exist, investment externalities must therefore satisfy F P .
In the in…nite delay case, it is possible to fully characterize simultaneous equilibrium. This characterization is similar to Proposition 2, but is not a proper subcase because Assumption (B)
does not enter into the result. Moreover, it is informative to express the necessary and su¢ cient condition for simultaneous equilibrium (7) in a form that distinguishes the e¤ect of investment externalities. To this end, we now introduce a threshold, S1 ( ; ) 
This expression appears as an upper bound on relative investment cost ( F ) in Proposition 4 below. The following lemma describes the behavior of S1 ( ; ).
Lemma 2 P < S1 ( ; ), S1 ( ; ) 2 h 11 01 10 00
; 1 , and
In what follows, we denote S1 ( ; ) simply by S1 . The conditions on F characterizing simultaneous equilibrium is:
Proposition 4 Suppose that joint investment is not desirable ( 00 11 ), and that a preemption equilibrium exists ( F P ). Then, a simultaneous equilibrium arises if and only if F S1 .
Proof See Appendix A.6
Propositions 1 and 4 together describe the qualitative evolution of equilibrium as a function of the relative investment cost F . There are three equilibrium regions. First, if the relative investment cost of the second …rm is low (0 F < P ), no …rm wishes to enter …rst so there is no preemption, and only non-investment simultaneous equilibrium or attrition. Second, in an intermediate range of relative investment cost ( P F S1 ), both preemption and simultaneous equilibria exist, with the simultaneous equilibirum dominating the sequential one. Third, if the relative investment cost of the second …rm is su¢ ciently high ( S1 < F ), only preemption (sequential investment) arises as an equilibrium. Thus, greater negative investment externalities increase the likelihood of preemption and reduce the likelihood of a simultaneous in…nite delay equilibrium.
By a similar argument as in the previous section, here also Proposition 3 applies to show that a simultaneous equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Moreover, analogously to Corollary 2, applying Lemma 2 one obtains:
Corollary 4 If investment externalities are non-negative and ‡ow pro…ts are supermodular, then a simultaneous equilibrium arises for all . Also, an increase in reduces the likelihood of simultaneous equilibrium. Finally, rent-shifting investment ( 00 11 ) raises the likelihood of simultaneous equilibrium.
Cooperation (with Asymmetric Investment Triggers)
Papers on real options game generally assume non-cooperative behavior on the part of …rms. 20 This section studies investment timing with an alternative behavioral hypothesis, which is that …rms choose triggers so as to maximize industry pro…t. If contracting options such side payments are allowed between parties, …rms might choose to cooperate on the choice of asymmetric 2 0 A notable exception is Weeds [29] , where …rms invest in uncertain R&D projects, and can cooperate by adopting a joint-investment strategy, as if they were two R&D units under common ownership. This is a new market model (pre-investment pro…ts are zero) with negative pro…t externalities (successful innovation by one …rm eliminates pro…ts for its competitor), and there is no investment externality unless …rms opt for R&D cooperation. investment triggers. We refer to this framework as cooperation. 21 Before an investment occurs each …rm's ‡ow pro…t is 00 , and in case of monopoly investment the average industry pro…t is 10 + 01 2
. The ex-ante industry value (where J stands for "joint"), when the current value of the multiplicative shock is y, is
Firms that cooperate will choose triggers that optimize the payo¤ (12), solving the problem
. This optimization problem is, in fact, the same as that of a monopoly …rm, if it has the option to make not just one but two investments. The optimum need not be the symmetric triggers (y S ; y S ) because the …rms may collectively prefer to stagger their investments.
Provided that 00 < , de…ne the trigger ) so the industry payo¤ (J) has a well-de…ned maximum. 22 Optimal cooperation involves either symmetric duopoly investment, asymmetric duopoly investment, or a single …rm investment:
(i) when monopoly investment lowers industry pro…t ( 00 ), optimal cooperation involves symmetric investment triggers (y S ; y S ), where y S is in…nite if 00 11 ;
(ii) when monopoly investment raises industry pro…t ( > 00 ), optimal cooperation involves …nite symmetric investment triggers (y S ; y S ) if and only if
and asymmetric investment triggers (y L ; y F ) otherwise, where y F is in…nite if 11 .
Proof See Appendix A.7 2 1 Here again we do not use the term "collusion" because explicit agreements on investment times do not clearly constitute an illegal practice in the same way as price-…xing agreements do. Comparing Proposition 5 with Corollaries 2 and 3, the conditions for simultaneous equilibrium when …rms act non-cooperatively are independent of the type of optimal solution they choose if they act cooperatively.
Corollary 5
The greater the (negative) simultaneous investment externality (the larger is S ), the more likely it is that optimal cooperation involves asymmetric investment. If joint investment is desirable ( 11 > 00 ), then the larger is , the less likely it is that optimal cooperation involves asymmetric investments.
Proof The …rst part follows directly from (13) . To establish the second, note that in the limit, (13) requires
.e. 11 00 < min f 00 ; 11 g.
Applications
In the real option games literature, ‡ow pro…ts are generally not speci…ed further than the reduced form . At the same time, compatibility between the simultaneous equilibrium conditions (condition (7) in Proposition 2 and condition (13) in Proposition 5) and economic fundamentals is not apparent at …rst glance. The examples of this section provide a comprehensive study of di¤erent natures of equilibria by specifying the economic model generating the ‡ow pro…t. We focus on two structures that are associated with preemption games, namely capacity expansion and R&D investment, which o¤er simple applications of the theoretical results we derived in the previous sections.
Capacity Investment with Quantity Competition
A canonical application of preemption is to capacity investment by duopolists. In a forthcoming paper, Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [4] study industry development with Cournot duopolists that acquire lumpy capacity units over time as inverse demand grows stochastically. Firms face an inverse market demand that is of the form Y t D (x 1 + x 2 ), where Y t is a stochastic multiplicative shock and x i refers to …rm output, have zero marginal production cost, and compete in quantity.
Over time, …rms engage in several rounds of lumpy capacity investment over an industry development "tree". We consider a subcase of their model in two respects. First, we assume that the ex-ante symmetric …rms have su¢ cient installed capacity so that just a single investment round is necessary for them to reach the Cournot equilibrium output level. Second, inverse demand is here speci…ed to be linear,
Let k denote the existing capacity of each …rm, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the (lumpy) increase in capacity that results from the acquisition of another unit of the speci…c input. Both …rms are initially capacity constrained at k, so they earn 00 = (1 2k) k, with 0 k 1=2. Each …rm can relax the constraint by investing in one additional unit of size > 0. 23 The end of the investment game is near, in that a single round of investment remains.
That is, x c k < x c , where here x c = 1 3 denotes the unconstrained Cournot output level, so that 11 = 1 9 . Firms decide non-cooperatively (contracts are ruled out) and without commitment when to invest in an additional unit. There are no investment externalities, that is F = S = 1.
In this framework, we seek conditions on the parameters k and under which a simultaneous equilibrium arises (we leave cooperative equilibrium aside in this example). This allows us to partition the (k; ) parameter space (see Figure 2) . Even with simplifying assumptions (linear demand, no investment externalities, single capacity investment, no cooperation), a variety of equilibrium con…gurations emerges. Broadly, the likelihood of simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium increases with …rms' initial installed capacity k, so coordination is "likelier when …rms have footholds rather than toeholds", and is non-decreasing in the capacity increment .
Note …rst that the parameter space is bounded by the constraint that …rms are initially capacity constrained and that the end of the game is near. With the linear inverse demand,
k < x c implies k 2 0; k. Next, if the investment increment is relatively small, a …rm that invests independently in additional capacity, while its rival does not invest, may still be capacity constrained relatively to its Cournot best reply. Slightly abusing terminology, we refer to this situation as the capacity constrained case. With the linear inverse demand a …rm's best response is a corner solution x i (k) = k + (rather than the best-reply (1 2k ) and 01 = k (1 2k ) (rather
in the unconstrained case). The construction of Figure 2 thus runs as follows. Below the light solid line ( = 1 3 k), more than one investment round is necessary to attain the Cournot capacities, so we restrict attention to the points above that line.
In the latter subspace, the light dashed line ( = 1 2 3 2 k) partitions those parameter values for which …rms are capacity constrained (below) in case of unilateral investment from those for which they are not (above).
Against this backdrop, the conditions for simultaneous equilibrium may be assessed. To do that, note …rst that, with F = S = 1 the condition in (7) simpli…es to the form e f ( ) uv + 1 11 > 00 w 1 where u function is there to capture the speci…cation that 11 00 implies y S = 1, hence
.) The following lemma describes the behavior of e f , independently of the speci…cation of ‡ow pro…t (and thus applies whether …rms are capacity constrained or not).
Lemma 3
The function e f is quasiconcave, and e f (1) 1 with equality if and only if 11 00 .
Proof: See Appendix A.8
By Lemma 3, if 11 < 00 we have e f (1) > 1, so that a simultaneous equilibrium exists over an interval of values 1; , by continuity. Otherwise e f (1) = 1, and a simultaneous equilibrium arises for some only if e f 0 (1) 0. Three additional frontiers can now be depicted in Figure 2 . First, with the linear inverse demand speci…cation, the dotted vertical line k = 1 6 is the locus of points for which 11 = 00 . Joint investment is desirable ( 11 > 00 ) only to the left of that frontier. Next, we graph two bold curves. The one to the left plots the values of (k; ) for which e f (1) = 1 and e f 0 (1) = 0. The other bold curve, to the right, separates out those values for which is strictly submodular, i.e. 00 + 11 < 01 + 10 , (bottom and left) for which they are not (to the Northeast). Evaluating, ‡ow pro…ts are strictly supermodular if k > 5 21 (not capacity constrained case) or (1 2k) k + (2k + ) (2k + 1) + 1 9 < 0 (capacity constrained case). This leads to a partition of the parameter space into three subregions. In the middle region, both Assumptions (A) and (B) are veri…ed, so that Proposition 2 applies directly. Indeed, as F = S = 1, the negative pro…t externality, with implies that Assumption (A) is veri…ed for all parameter values, also implies that Assumption (B) is veri…ed if and only if is submodular. 24 In that case, the condition in (7) is satis…ed so long as is "not too large", with an upper bound that increases with k. Moreover, the desirability of joint investment determines the nature the simultaneous equilibrium that may arise. To the left of k = 1 6 , in any simultaneous equilibrium …rms invest at a …nite trigger beyond the preemption triggers, whereas to the right …rms abstain from ever investing.
Next, in the leftmost region, we have 11 > 00 and e f 0 (1) < 0, and there is no simultaneous equilibrium for any value of . Finally, in the rightmost region, all points are to the right of the joint desirability frontier, so 11 > 00 , and is supermodular. It follows from Corollary 4 that a simultaneous equilibrium exists for all in this region.
To summarize, a rich pattern of equilibria arises:
Proposition 6 Greater preexisting capacity k, as well as greater increments (if preexisting capacity is su¢ ciently large) increase the likelihood of simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium.
When k is low enough there is no simultaneous equilibrium for any , as in the new market case.
A detailed welfare analysis is beyond the scope of the present paper but we can make the following observations. If preexisting capacities are low (for k < 1=6), …rms eventually invest and both reach the Cournot outcome in the product market more or less early, whether by means of a staggered or a joint investment. However, if preexisting capacities are high, in a simultaneous equilibrium …rms might never invest and product market outcomes may be perennially less competitive than those of Cournot competition, and (because investment is lumpy) for some parameter values even strictly less competitive than the monopoly outcome (when k 2 [1=6; 1=4), for large enough ), even though no illegal collusion (in the sense of a price-…xing or market-sharing agreement) has occurred. 2 4 More precisely, with F = S = 1, the negative pro…t externality ( 10 11) implies that
, which is equivalent to y L y S , and the submodularity of ( 10 + 01 11 + 00) is equivalent to 1 11 01 10 00
, or y L y F .
R&D Investment with Spillovers
It is natural to construe investment expenditures as investments in R&D. In fact, it is these applications that the timing games literature -upon which real option games are built -considered originally (Reinganum [25] ). In this application we specify the reduced form ‡ow pro…ts by adapting an approach to R&D due to Kamien, Muller, and Zang [19] . 25 Two …rms engage in R&D before selling vertically di¤erentiated products. Each …rm's decides on an amount of R&D expenditure, denoted by x i , i 2 f1; 2g, which is taken here to be a discrete choice in f0; xg. To be consistent with the assumption of a multiplicative shock, we suppose that R&D is demand-enhancing, i.e. …rm i's inverse demand function is linear and speci…ed as p i = a + q 2 (x i + x j ) q, where p i is …rm i's price, q the total quantity, and the variable cost of production is zero. In such models of R&D, the parameter 2 [0; 1] re ‡ects the degree of inter-…rm technological spillovers. 26 If = 0, each …rm's individual R&D expenditure bene…ts only itself. If = 1, the bene…t spills over completely to the other …rm. With these assumptions, it can be veri…ed that, up to a normalization, gross instantaneous pro…ts are
so investment is always jointly desirable ( 00 11 ), and is submodular. 27 Here x is an R&D budget. Therefore, we specify the cost of exercising the investment option as I L = I F = x. In the simultaneous case, we specify I S = (1 + ) x. The latter parametrization re ‡ects a possible pecuniary synergy ( 1 < 0) or congestion ( > 0) when …rms conduct R&D simultaneously (see Vencatachellum and Versaevel [28] and references therein).
In this example, as F = 1 (by assumption), Proposition 1-(i) never applies. We also have F P (because P 2 (0; 1] from Lemma 1), and 11 < 10 (negative pro…t externalities) if and only if < 9=16 (i.e., spillovers are low enough). It follows that, in the latter case, Proposition 1-(ii) applies, so that a preemption equilibrium exists, otherwise the game is one of attrition.
Joint investment is always desirable ( 00 < 11 ), so in a simultaneous equilibrium, both …rms engage in R&D at the …nite trigger y S . It is also easy to check that, in the low-spillover case, nonpositive pro…t externalities imply that Assumption (A) holds for all , and y L < y F so Assumption 2 5 The R&D speci…cations that we use here results in submodular pro…ts over the relevant parameter range, which simpli…es the analysis. This does not hold with R&D outputs as in d'Aspremont and Jacquemin [8] 's model (in lieu of R&D inputs as in Kamien et al. [19] ), which researchers have argued possesses less intuitive properties (Amir [1] ). 2 6 Spillovers are usually denoted by the letter , but we use here to avoid confusion with the discounting parameter. 2 7 Rearranging, one …nds 00 + 11
(B) holds also whenever y L < y S , or equivalently 10 11 10 00 . In that case Proposition 2 applies, and we need only concentrate on condition (7) for the existence of a simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium. If < 10 11 10 00
, recall that (7) remains su¢ cient for a simultaneous equilibrium.
Finally, (7) holds for = 1, so the existence of simultaneous equilibrium is thus established for in a neighborhood of 1 when the derivative of the left-hand term is strictly positive. The latter result may be represented in the parameter space ( ; ). In Figure 3 , to the left of the dashed line ( = 9 16 ), …rms play a game of preemption rather than attrition, and the solid curve delimits the region over which a simultaneous equilibrium exists. When pro…t externalities are not too large ( 16 ) and there are synergies resulting from simultaneous investment ( negative and low enough), then a simultaneous equilibrium exists for a low enough discounting term .
A key area of interest in models of R&D is the study of inter-…rm (horizontal) cooperation.
This re ‡ects both …rm practice, and the fact that R&D cooperation agreements are accepted, if not viewed favorably, by competition authorities (Martin [19] ). Since …rms may legally make binding agreements in this context, the cooperation framework (Proposition 5) seems to be the most adapted. An important result from the literature using static games is that industry pro…t in not necessarily quasiconcave, so a corner solution with asymmetric investment can be optimal in the cooperative regime, one …rm then relying on the R&D e¤ort of the other (Leahy and Neary, [21] ).
To apply Proposition 5, it is …rst useful to observe that as is strictly submodular ( 00 + 11 < 10 + 01 ) we have F = 1 > 11 00
, so the industry payo¤ (J) has a well-de…ned maximum. The submodularity of , together with joint investment desirability, also directly imply that monopoly investment raises industry pro…t ( 00 < ). It follows that case (ii) in Proposition 5 determines the R&D choice under a cooperative regime. Whether investment triggers are symmetric or not then depends on condition (13).
In Figure 3 , to the right of the dotted line we have 11 > , although the distinction is not important with the parameter values that are adopted here. The dashed curve is the locus of points at which condition (13) just holds, assuming = 2. Thus, for large enough externalities, asymmetric duopoly investment is optimal. Moreover, symmetric investment may be optimal, but nevertheless not arise as a non-cooperative equilibrium. Below the solid curve, the simultaneous equilibrium coincides with the industry optimum.
To summarize, from the speci…cation of investment cost externalities, together with conditions (7) and (13) , in this example we have:
The greater the synergy (the smaller is ), the more likely the existence of a simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium, and the more likely it is that optimal cooperation and the simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium coincide.
A Appendix
A. 
Since P (0; ) = 0 and P (1; ) = 1, it follows that P (z; ) 2 (0; 1).
Also,
. Since x ln x x 1 with equality if and
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The existence of a preemption equilibrium hinges on the behavior of the di¤erence L (y) F (y). , all y y F .
Then the preemption threshold y P is the lower root of the equation
exists. There are two cases to consider. 
The maximizer satis…es b y y F . Otherwise, if 11 01 ( 11 10 ), then f (y) is increasing and strictly convex in y. In both of these subcases, f (y) is increasing in y over the relevant interval (0; y F ), and therefore a preemption equilibrium exists if and only if f (y
(ii) 11 < 10 In this case, (7)) is necessary for the existence of a simultaneous (coordination) equilibrium. Otherwise, we proceed by distinguishing two cases. 
The last inequality follows from Assumption (B). Therefore, in this case S (y) L(y) 0 on 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proceed by contradiction, by supposing that V P (y) > S (y) for some y 2 [0; y S ]. Then y y P L (y P ) 00 r y P > I S 1 y y S .
Since Assumption (A) holds, b y is well-de…ned (by (16) 
Developing L (y P ) and using (20) , (19) holds if and only if
but f attains a maximum at 
which is negative since ln 10 00 10 01
< 0. Therefore, P < S1 ( ; ). Second, lim !1 
The expression in brackets is negative since 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
If 00 , J is increasing in y L over R + and the optimum is (y S ; y S ) on the boundary of J's domain. Note that when 00 11 , y S = 1. If > 00 , J is quasiconcave in y L with an interior optimum at y L . If 11 , J is increasing in y F over over R + and the global optimum is (y L ; 1), i.e. monopoly investment. Otherwise ( 2 ( 00 ; 11 )), the optimal second trigger is …nite, y F .
Note that y F > y L if F > 11 00
. The condition (13) assures that the local maximum (y L ; y F ) is a strict global maximum. Finally, this condition always holds if 11 00 .
A.8 Proof of Lemma 3
For the …rst part, evaluating in the case where 11 00 (otherwise w can be set to 0), e f 00 ( ) = e f 0 ( ) w ln w ln v + uv ln v + w (ln w) 2 ;
so at any 0 satisfying e f 0 ( 0 ) = 0, e f 00 ( 0 ) w 0 (ln w) (ln w ln v) 0;
where the …rst inequality holds because ln v 0, and the second because w v. 
